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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TTS DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION 
OVER THIS APPEAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO 
PRESENT "SUBSTANTIAL AND IMPORTANT" REASONS AS 
REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW. 
This Court should deny Defendants' Petition because there are no substantial and 
important reasons for this Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision ("Decision"). 
Rule 46 controls this Court's review of petitions for writ of certiorari: "Review by a writ 
of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for 
special and important reasons." Utah R. Civ. App. 46(a). The Rule lists four examples 
that this Court will consider in determining whether "special and important" reasons exist 
to justify review. Id. at Rule 46(a)(l)-(4). 
Defendants/Appellants ("Defendants") cite only two reasons in support of this 
Court's jurisdiction: 1) the Decision conflicts with other Court of Appeals' decisions; 
and, 2) the Decision conflicts with this Court's prior decisions. Defendants'/Appellants' 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari ("Petition") at 9. Neither claim is accurate, as will be 
shown below. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals' decision is in harmony with prior 
decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals. This Court should therefore decline its 
jurisdiction because it is not justified by substantial and important reasons required under 
the Rules. Before turning to that analysis, however, it is appropriate to consider the 
public policy that supports denial of this Court's jurisdiction. 
1 
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A, STARE DECISIS AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT 
SUPPORT JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE DECISION 
IN THIS CASE IS IN HARMONY WITH PRIOR CASES. 
In the context of Rule 46(a)(1) and (2), the doctrine of stare decisis compels 
appellants to demonstrate an actual conflict for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction.1 
The principle of stare decisis is that, "[w]hen a court lays down a rule of law attaching a 
specific legal consequence to a detailed set of facts, the court must adhere to the legal 
principle it has announced by applying it in all subsequent cases that come before it 
presenting a similar factual premise." Comment, THE STRAITS OF STARE DECISIS AND THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS: NAVIGATING THE SCYLLA OF UNDER-APPLICATION AND THE 
CHARYBDIS OF OVER-APPLICATION, 633 BYU L. Rev 1994 at 641. (footnotes omitted). 
There are compelling public policy reasons that support this Court's application of the 
principle of stare decisis, and decline jurisdiction in this case, including reliance and 
stability interests, judicial expedition and economy, and the image of justice. Id. at 641. 
In this case, because there is no conflict between the Decision and decisions of the Court 
of Appeals or the Supreme Court, this Court is bound to apply its prior decisions to the 
case at bar, and deny Defendants' petition for writ of certiorari. 
1
 This is not to say that there can be no other "special and important" reasons for 
this Court to exercise its jurisdiction. There may be other reasons. See, e.g. Utah R. Civ. App. 
46(a)(3) and (4). In this case, however, these "conflicts" are the only reasons Defendant cites in 
support of this Court's jurisdiction. 
2 
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1. The Decision is Consistent with Supreme Court Decisions. 
There is no conflict between this Court's prior decisions and the Decision. In the 
case of Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980), this Court recognized that in 
medical malpractice cases, there is no need for expert testimony where lay jurors can 
understand the standard of care. In Nixdorf, this Court held that no expert testimony was 
required to establish the standard of care where a doctor left a surgical cutting needle in 
the Plaintiff. Id. at 352. This principle is sometimes called the "common-knowledge" 
exception in the context of medical malpractice. See, e.g.. Decision at ^ 8. Nixdorf is the 
most recent Supreme Court case in a line of cases that illustrate the common-knowledge 
exception in medical malpractice cases. See, Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 352 n.5, and numerous 
cases cited therein. As shown infra, Nixdorf has been consistently followed by Utah 
Courts in medical malpractice cases where jurors can understand the applicable standard 
of care.2 
2
 The position of Utah Courts on this issue is consistent with that of other States. 
Negligence in health care facilities that involves non-professional care requires no expert 
testimony. See, e.g., Moore v. Lewis Smith Memorial Hosp.. Inc., 454 S.E. 2d 190, 191 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1995)(holding injury suffered when Plaintiff moved from wheelchair to bed in health care 
facility was ordinary negligence, and not medical malpractice), and, Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care 
Center. 741 969, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(holding no expert testimony required where standard 
to protect disabled woman from rape was within common knowledge of jurors). 
Instead, Courts focus on the character of the care at issue, and not merely where 
the injury occurred. See, e^ , Beverly Enterprise-Virginia, Inc.. T/A. Etc. v. Nichols, 441 S.E.2d 
1 (Va. 1994) (holding no expert testimony required to establish nursing home negligence where 
patient choked on food and died, where employees failed to assist patient with history of choking 
problems); and, Williamson v. Provident Group. Inc.. 550 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Neb. 1996) 
(affirming refusal for directed verdict because no expert testimony required in slip and fall case 
involving assisted care facility where no professional negligence alleged), rev'd. on other grounds. 
3 
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Curiously, Defendants cite Nixdorf to suggest that it conflicted with the Decision. 
Petition at 11-12. The Decision, however, cited to Nixdorf to illustrate the common 
knowledge exception, and its application to Collins' facts. Decision at ffl[ 7 and 8. 
Defendants can not claim that Nixdorf as support for its claim that the Decision is 
"conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court," Utah R. Civ. App. P. 46(a)(2). To the 
contrary, the Court of Appeals' application of Nixdorf can only be interpreted a 
principled example of stare decisis. The Decision is in harmony with Nixdorf and does 
not support the exercise of this Court's discretionary jurisdiction. 
The other Utah Supreme Court case cited by Defendants addressed an issue not 
reached by the Decision, and is not in conflict with the issue on appeal. Defendants cited 
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985) for the proposition 
that the standard of care in a trade or profession must be determined by the testimony of 
witnesses in the same trade or profession. Petition at 12. The Court of Appeals, 
however, did not reach this issue because it recognized that Collins had established the 
applicable standard of care and breach of that standard with lay testimony. Decision at ^ 
12. The issue before this Court is not who may testify to establish the applicable standard 
of care, but whether the jurors needed expert testimony, as a threshold matter, to 
understand the applicable standard of care in Collins' case. Wessel simply has no 
application to the Decision, and therefore does not illustrate a conflict, much less a 
substantial and important reason, to justify the exercise of this Court's discretionary 
jurisdiction. 
4 
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2. The Decision is Consistent with Other Court of Appeals 
Decisions. 
The Decision is in harmony with other Court of Appeals decisions. To determine 
whether to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, this Court must consider whether "the 
Court of Appeals [has rendered] a decision in conflict with the decision of another panel 
on the same issue of law." Utah R. Civ. App. P. 46(a)(1). The cases cited by Defendants 
do not conflict with the Decision, but are in harmony with it. 
The sole issue raised by Defendants' appeal goes to whether the standard of care 
in medical malpractice case can be established by lay testimony. Defendant, however, 
cited the case of Hoopiiaina v. IHC 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) for several 
propositions, including: "expert testimony must be provided in medical malpractice cases 
to establish the standard of care, [and to show] defendant's failure to comply with that 
standard . . . ." Petition at 12. Hoopiiaina. however, does not address those issues. 
The only issue in Hoopiiaina was whether the plaintiff needed an expert to opine 
on medical causation and damages. Hoopiiaina.740 P.2d at 271. In Hoopiiaina. IHC 
stipulated to its breach of the standard of care when it gave plaintiff medications that 
were prescribed to another patient. Id. Hoopiiaina does not "conflict" with the Decision 
because Hoopiiaina never addressed the standard of care, which is the only issue raised in 
this appeal. Defendants have failed to show a conflict, let alone substantial and important 
reasons, for this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. 
5 
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The other Court of Appeals case cited by Defendants actually support the 
Decision. Defendants cited Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor Inc., 871 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). Petition at 13. The Schreiter case was a negligence case where the plaintiff 
sued for personal injuries arising from a fire where the building owner failed to install a 
fire sprinkler system. Id. The Court specifically disavowed the need for expert testimony 
to establish the standard of care under those facts: "This is simply not a situation where 
the issues or facts appear to be so complex or technical that they would otherwise elude 
the mental processes of the average citizen." Id. at 575. (citing Nixdorf with approval). 
Schreiter is not in conflict with the Decision. To the contrary, Schreiter is another 
example of the Court of Appeals exercising the doctrine of stare decisis, and following 
this Court's prior authority under similar facts. 
* * * 
In sum, the cases cited by Defendants as the basis for exercising this Court's 
discretionary jurisdiction do not show a conflict between the cases and the Decision. 
Defendant appears to equate the common-knowledge exception - where expert testimony 
is not required to establish the standard of care and breach - with the "conflict" required 
for this Court's jurisdiction under Utah law. However, the common-knowledge exception 
in medical malpractice cases is well-established and necessary. The application of this 
doctrine to the facts of this case simply creates no conflict with Utah case law. 
Consequently, there are no substantial and important reasons to justify this Court's 
jurisdiction. This Court should therefore deny Defendants' Petition. 
6 
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R THIS C0T TRT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANT'S PETITION BECAUSE 
ITINVC ES A QUESTION OF WELL-ESTA LISHED STATE LAW 
OF LIMI D APPLICATION. 
This appeal involves a simple negligence tort claim that deals with well established 
legal precedent, and does not warrant this Court's discretionary review. Although 
Defendants argued that the Court of Appeals' decision at bar was in "conflict" with prior 
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court cases,3 it is notable that Appellant did not claim that 
this appeal should be heard under Rule 46(a)(4). Under that Rule, this Court considers 
appeals where the Court of Appeals "has decided an important question of . . . state . . . 
law which has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court." Utah R. Civ. App. 
P 46(a)(4). (emphasis added). Without trivializing the tragic facts of this case, it is 
essentially a negligence case where a severely disabled woman fell from a swing at the 
facility of a "healthcare provider," as that term is used in the Utah Healthcare Malpractice 
Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3 (11) (1998). 
While the issue on appeal is of critical importance to the parties, it is doubtful that 
its resolution will have any widespread impact in the field of medical malpractice. The 
issue is, after all, a well-recognized "exception" to most malpractice cases, where medical 
procedures are typically at issue. Put another way, this case raises an issue that pertains 
to a small subcategory of medical malpractice cases, which is already a small subcategory 
of negligence cases. The paucity of reported cases on this issue supports this observation. 
3
 The well-established common-knowledge exception for medical malpractice cases 
is not, however, a "conflict." See discussion, supra. Sections A, Parts 1 and 2. 
7 
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Also, this issue is well settled under Utah law, as evidenced by the principled and 
consistent application of this "exception" as reported in the cases. Moreover, the State 
has not claimed that this narrow issue raises any special status issues that distinguishes 
the State's role from that of a private litigant grappling with the same limited issue. At 
bottom, Defendants are simply dissatisfied with the Decision, and have failed to marshal 
substantial and important reasons that are required to justify this Court's discretionary 
review. 
II DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN SECTIONS A. AND C. 
ADDRESS NONE OF THE CRITERIA LISTED IN RULE 46, AND 
SHOULD BE STRICKEN. 
Defendants have ignored the legal requirements of petitions for writ of certiorari, 
and its argument should be stricken from the record. Rule 49 requires Petitioners to 
"present a direct and concise argument explaining the special reasons as provided in Rule 
46 for the issuance of the writ." Utah R. Civ. App. P. 49(a)(9). As set forth above, the 
only reasons proffered by Defendants went to Rule 46(a)(1) and (2), which showed no 
conflict with the cases of this Court or the Court of Appeals. 
Despite the specific requirements of Rule 49, the remainder of Defendants' 
Argument section mentions no other reason listed under Rule 46. Petition at 9-11 
(Section A), and 13-16 (Section C). Instead, Defendants argued the merits of the case 
they made at trial. Section A lists at length the regulations that Defendants believe 
applied to its treatment of Collins, which they made at trial. Petition at 9-11. Defendants 
also recites undisputed facts not at issue in this appeal that show Plaintiffs compliance 
8 
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with the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act. Id- at 10-11. This Court, however, reviews 
the decisions of the Court of Appeals, not the trial court. Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 
79 (Utah 1992). None of the contents of Section A address the legal requirements for 
granting certiorari, and therefore, can not form the basis for the exercise of this Court's 
discretionary review. 
Section C of the Petition then launches into the merits of the Decision, again, with 
no reference to any reason listed under Rule 46. To the extent that Defendants' 
arguments go to the merits of the Decision, they circumvent the purpose of principled 
discretionary review, namely, to limit review to only those litigants who demonstrate 
substantial and important reasons required by Rule 46. Only those litigants may argue 
the merits of their case before this Court.4 Defendants may not circumvent the legal 
requirements for certiorari by merely ignoring them. These Sections of Defendants' 
Petition should be stricken or ignored because they are wholly outside the provisions of 
Rule 49, and are both irrelevant and inappropriate at this point in the appeal. 
4
 Plaintiff resists the temptation to discuss the merits of the case at this time, and is 
content to await remand to the trial court after this Court denies Defendant's Petition. 
Alternatively, Plaintiff will address the merits of this case if and when this Court believes that 
there are "substantial and important" reasons to exercise its discretionary review, notwithstanding 
the Court of Appeals' principled and well-reasoned decision. 
9 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should deny Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari because there 
are no "substantial and important" reasons for this Court to exercise its discretionary 
review. While this issue is important to the parties, the issue raised on appeal involves 
well established case precedent in a narrow subcategory of medical malpractice cases that 
has minimal application outside of this case. The only relevant arguments put forth by 
Defendant fail to show any "conflict" with any cases from this Court and/or the Court of 
Appeals. Instead, the Decision is well reasoned, principled, and in harmony with the line 
of Utah cases that established the common-knowledge exception in medical malpractice 
cases. Neither Defendants' arguments to the trial court, nor its beliefs about the merits of 
its appeal are relevant or appropriate at this point in the appeal, and should be stricken or 
ignored. For these reasons, this Court should deny Petitioner's petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2000. 
KING & ISAACSON, PX. 
By: Brian S. King 
Richard R. Burke 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Vickie Collins 
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WRIT OF CERTIORARI, postage prepaid, this 18th day of February, 2000, to the 
following: 
BARBARA E. OCHOA 
STEVEN A. COMBE 
Assistant Attorneys General 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants/Petitioners 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
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